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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH AND MAGARIAN'S
DYNAMIC DIVERSITY
HEIDI KITROSSER*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has been praised
in many quarters as a committed ally of free speech.' Certainly, a number
of Roberts Court decisions do protect speech. Putting aside the Court's
controversial campaign finance decisions-the merits of which divide even
free speech advocates 2-the Roberts Court's speech-protective decisions
include several cases in which it refused to create new categories of
"unprotected" speech,' a decision striking a buffer zone around abortion
clinics as too restrictive of protests,4 and a case in which the Court rejected
a provision conditioning certain federal funds on recipients' adopting a
particular policy position.'
While I am mostly very pleased with the Court's speech-protective
decisions,6 I count myself among those who think that the Court has not, on
balance, been a champion of free speech. I take this view in light of the vast
deference that the Court has accorded the government to suppress speech in
* Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See, e.g., GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT'S FIRST
AMENDMENT xiii-iv (2017) (noting that "[m]any free speech advocates revere the Roberts Court," and
citing examples); Steve Chapman, The John Roberts Court: Champion ofFree Speech, CHI. TRIB. (July
26, 2017, 2:48 PM), https://perma.cc/52RH-9FQ5 (praising the Roberts Court as a champion of free
speech and citing others to this effect); Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the
First Amendment, 25 J.L. & Pol'y 63, 65 (2016) (crediting the Roberts Court with having "created a sort
of free speech 'Camelot').
2. Compare, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rift in the ACLU Over Free Speech, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 8, 2014, 8:00 PM), https://perma.cc/8BL5-Z7JN (noting that he, a "card-carrying member
of the ACLU for 40 years and a member of the ACLU's National Advisory Council . .. once shared the
view that campaign finance regulations violated the First Amendment," but that he "has since come to
a different set of conclusions") and Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
723, 732-33 (2011) (criticizing the notion that "spending money in election campaigns is speech" but
writing that "even if one accepts [that] premise ... two decisions ofthe Roberts Court suggest that what
really animates its decisions is a hostility to campaign finance laws much more than a commitment to
expanding speech") with Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. 77 (2010)
(defending the Citizens United decision and arguing that its critics have been too dismissive of its first
amendment reasoning) and Gora, supra note 1, at 66-67, 85-99 (celebrating the campaign finance
decisions of the Roberts Court).
3. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718-22 (2012) (declining to deem false speech
categorically unprotected); Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792-95 (2011) (rejecting
California's position that the sale of violent video games to minors should be categorically unprotected);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-72 (2010) (refusing to deem depictions of animal cruelty
categorically unprotected).
4. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537-2541 (2014).
5. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 220 (2013).
6. 1 add the qualifier "mostly" because I too have strong reservations about the campaign
finance decisions.
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several contexts. These include those in which threats to national security
are invoked,' those in which the government purports to act as a speaker
itself,' or those in which the government acts in a managerial role, such as
employer,9 jailer,io or educator.'
This is not a mere matter of tallying free speech wins and losses. My
concern is not simply the number of problematic cases, but the importance
of the speech that they fail to protect, and the danger of the discretion that
they accord the government. For example, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project12 impacts core political speech-ranging from the teaching of
peaceful international conflict resolution to the writing of amicus briefs to
the U.S. Supreme Court-coordinated with a designated foreign terrorist
organization (FTO). 13 Despite the FTO label's ominous ring, courts have
been highly deferential toward the government's designations,' 4 just as the
HLP Court was deeply credulous in evaluating Congress' assertions
regarding the dangers of coordinated speech." In another pair of cases, the
Roberts Court took an expansive view of the speech forums that the
government may claim as its own, rather than belonging to the public.' 6 In
so doing, the Court widened the space-both physical and virtual-in which
the government may exclude speakers based on content or even viewpoint. "
I am not alone, of course, in noticing the anti-speech tenor of many
Roberts Court decisions. Others have observed and lamented this reality, as
well as the distance between it and the Roberts Court's reputation as a free
speech stalwart.'8 And now, in a terrific new book called Managed Speech:
7. See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech and National Security Bootstraps, 86 FORDHAM L. REv.
509, 514-17, 523-29 (2017) (criticizing holding and analysis in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1 (2010), and citing criticisms by others).
8. See MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at 95-105 (criticizing decisions in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) and Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239 (2015)).
9. See Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REv. 301,
302-03, 310-12, 330-36 (201.6) (criticizing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)).
10. See MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at 70-73 (criticizing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006)).
11. Id. at 73-78 (criticizing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)).
12. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
13. See Kitrosser, Free Speech and National Security Bootstraps, supra note 7, at 514-17.
14. See id. at 512-14, 528-29.
15. Id. at 514-17, 523-28.
16. See MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at 95-105 (discussing decisions in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (involving monuments in a public park) and Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons
of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) (concerning specialized license plate designs)).
17. See sources cited supra note 16.
18. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 94
DENV. L. REv. 553, 554, 558-62 (2017) (Chemerinsky calls the Roberts Court "a Supreme Court that
is very protective of freedom of speech except when the institutional interest of the government as
government are implicated. Then it's not at all protective of speech."); Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional
Freedom: The Roberts Court, the FirstAmendment, and the NewAbsolutism, 76 ALB. L. REv. 409,451-
52 (2013) ("If the Roberts Court's new absolutism is a cause for elation in some First Amendment
quarters, then its rulings on student speech, government employee speech, and prisoner speech, along
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The Roberts Court's First Amendment, Professor Greg Magarian of the
Washington University School of Law adds important new insights to the
mix.' 9 The Roberts Court, Magarian observes, is committed to "managed
speech." "Managed speech describes a mode of First Amendment
jurisprudence that seeks to reconcile substantial First Amendment
protection for expressive freedom with aggressive preservation of social and
political stability. . . . [It] concentrates managerial power over public
discussion in the government or in favored private actors."20 From this
perspective, it makes perfect sense for the Roberts Court to fiercely protect
the government's ability to control speech within public spaces and
government operations. And the Court's many decisions favoring private
speakers for the most part can be explained either as bolstering powerful
interests or as very narrowly applying, extending, or qualifying precedent.2 1
In contrast to managed speech, Magarian supports an approach that he calls
"dynamic diversity," which "seeks to maximize . . . diversity of ideas" and
diversity of speakers in public discussion. 2  We should value dynamic
diversity, he explains, because it protects free speech's role as "an engine
of political and social change." 23 "Dissent lies at the heart of dynamic
diversity." 24
In this Article-prepared for a symposium to honor Professor
Magarian's book-I use the concepts of dynamic diversity and managed
speech as jumping off points to consider the constitutional value of speech
produced by public employees in the course of doing their jobs ("public
employee work product speech") and the Roberts Court's approach to the
same. In Part I, I posit that, despite dynamic diversity's repeated emphasis
on public discourse, its underlying reasoning contains the seeds of strong
support for the notion that public employee work product speech-
including that conveyed internally-is of high First Amendment value. This
is so for two reasons. First, much public employee work product speech
does impact public discourse directly or indirectly. Second, even purely
internal work product speech serves the ultimate end toward which dynamic
diversity aims: "challenging stable institutions and testing new ideas."25
Indeed, there is little more effective way to bake dialogic challenge into the
with its anti-terrorism material support ruling must be cause for discontent."); Chemerinsky, supra note
2, at 724 (citing the Roberts Court's reputation among some as a free speech champion, and objecting
that "the Roberts Court's overall record suggests that it is not a free speech Court at all").
19. MAGARIAN, supra note 1.
20. Id. at xv.
21. Id. at 228-34, 239.
22. Id. at xvii.
23. Id at xvii.
24. Id. at xviii (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at xviii.
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production of government ideas and actions than by placing expert career
employees throughout the government and granting them some protection
for their on-the-job speech. This conclusion is also buttressed by dynamic
diversity's emphasis on the value and vulnerability of political dissent. First
Amendment protections for work product speech also fittingly complement
the structural checking mechanisms that the Constitution builds into the
federal system. In Part II of the Article, I critique the approaches that the
Roberts Court has taken to public employee work product speech, including
its assessments of the speech's value and of the government's interests in
controlling it. In making these critiques, I draw from the insights of Part I
and from Professor Magarian's concept of managed speech.
I. DYNAMIC DIVERSITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE WORK PRODUCT SPEECH
As Professor Magarian explains it, dynamic diversity values public
discussion predominantly because it is the "primary medium for challenging
stable institutions and testing new ideas. . . . Action toward change can't
happen without speech. At the same time, speech is relatively safe. It lets us
hedge our bets at the margin where change challenges stability." 26
Public discourse can only serve as a conduit for change when a diversity
of speakers and ideas participate. Speech that dissents from conventional
wisdom, presenting listeners with new information and perspectives, is
especially valuable in this respect. Such speeth also is highly vulnerable,
given the challenge that it poses to the status quo.27 Political dissent, in
particular, is at heightened risk of government suppression. 28 Political
dissent "stands at the center of . .. dynamic diversity," for both its high
value and its susceptibility to repression. 29
In championing diversity of both speakers and ideas, and emphasizing
the importance of political dissent, Magarian widens the scope of existing,
democratic governance-based theories of free speech in important ways.
First, Magarian acknowledges that his theory is more inclusive than the self-
governance theory of Alexander Meiklejohn, insofar as Meiklejohn favored
diversity of ideas but not speakers. Indeed, Meiklejohn famously deemed it
"'essential.. . not that everyone shall speak but that everything worth saying
shall be said."'3 0 Magarian responds that speaker and idea diversity
generally "complement one another," and that "[e]nabling broad-based
26. Id. at xviii.
27. Id. at xviii.
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Id. at xvii (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960)).
[VOL. 95:14051408
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participation in public debate should generate a wide range of ideas." 31
Second, in strongly valuing political dissent, dynamic diversity
complements Vincent Blasi's important work stressing the value of free
speech for "checking the abuse of power by public officials."32 Yet dynamic
diversity encompasses much more than abuse-checking speech insofar as it
aims for a robust public discourse that includes a wide range of dissenters
as well as the ideas and information with which they grapple. Third,
Magarian combines his analyses of affirmative speech values with a healthy
dose of government distrust, echoing Frederick Schauer's insight that all
major free speech theories rightly share a core skepticism about government
control of speech.33 Indeed, Magarian repeatedly cites the heightened
susceptibility of dissent to repression, given powerful actors'-including
government's-investments in the status quo.34
Yet while dynamic diversity effectively justifies protections for a broad
range of political dissent and much other speech, less clear are its
implications for at least one important category of political speech: that
made by public employees in the course of doing their jobs. As it stands,
dynamic diversity's emphasis on public discourse makes it a somewhat
counter-intuitive tool for defending public employee speech that is
conveyed through internal channels. Work product speech is often, albeit
not always, conveyed internally, as with internal memoranda or
consultations. Magarian anticipates and addresses this point by citing
Blasi's work on the checking value of speech, and explaining that "public
employees can . . . perform the checking function within the government
workplace." 35 This analysis does not tell us, however, whether dynamic
diversity, in its own right, can support protecting internal workplace speech.
Yet despite dynamic diversity's repeated emphasis on public discourse,
its underlying reasoning contains the seeds of strong support for the notion
that public employee work product speech-including that conveyed
internally-is of high First Amendment value. This is so for at least two
reasons. First, much work product speech does make its way into public
discourse either directly or indirectly. And a close look at the types of work
product speech that are likely to trigger discipline reveals the ways in which
such speech can manifest political dissent. Insofar as workplace speech
indeed constitutes political dissent and impacts public discourse, dynamic
diversity plainly has much to tell us about its value. Second, dynamic
31. Id. at xvii.
32. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
521, 527 (1977).
33. Frederick Schauer, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 33-34, 44-46, 86, 162-63
(Cambridge, 1982).
34. MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xviii-xix.
35. Id. at 84.
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diversity's discussions of speaker diversity and of the value and
vulnerability of political dissent are equally applicable to internal
government discourse. Indeed, these features of dynamic diversity dovetail
very nicely with Professor Blasi's theory of checking value. Professor
Magarian thus would be well justified to reference checking theory not
simply as a supplement to dynamic diversity, but as a means to shed greater
light on the latter's own potential reach. Aspects of the federal separation of
powers also bolster the combined lessons of dynamic diversity and of
checking theory to support work product speech protections at the federal
level. 36
In Section I.A, I elaborate on the relationships between public employee
work product speech and public discourse, and explore the ways in which
work product speech can manifest itself as political dissent. Once we
recognize the role that work product speech can play as public political
dissent, dynamic diversity helps us to see its deep First Amendment value.
In Section I.B, I explain that dynamic diversity's underlying reasoning
dovetails naturally with checking theory, and that the insights of the two
theories together make a very strong case for protecting even purely internal
work product speech. The case is further buttressed by aspects of the federal
separation of powers.
A. Work Product Speech and Public Discourse
Public employee work product speech can very much impact public
discourse, whether directly or indirectly. This is most obvious when the
work product at issue is crafted for public view, such as where a government
scientist is tasked with drafting a report on climate change for public
consumption or a government economist prepares a budget document that
will be released publicly. Somewhat more indirectly, internal workplace
input can impact the statements and positions that the government takes
publicly. A government lawyer may meet with supervisors, for example, to
urge them to rethink a legal argument or factual assertion made in a brief
that will itself become a part of the public record, or to reconsider calling
certain witnesses in a public hearing. More broadly, internal
whistleblowing-that is, internal reporting about fraudulent, abusive, or
illegal practices-can substantially impact speech that does make its way to
the public, even where the internal whistleblowing itself does not see the
light of day. Internal reporting might, for example, help to stop faulty fact-
finding practices that shape the information eventually used in public
documents or statements. Internal reporting might also be directed against
36. See infra Section I.B.
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improperly politicized hiring of or retaliation against civil servants. Such
personnel practices themselves can affect the nature of government projects
undertaken, or of factual or policy analyses conducted that eventually make
their way to public view.
These examples also shed light on the different forms that dissent can
take. In its most familiar guise, of course, dissent entails explicitly disputing
particular practices or positions. But dissent can also manifest itself in the
simple acts of public employees doing their jobs conscientiously and in
accordance with the norms of their professions, despite pressure to place
political directives above those norms. When employees engage in such
behavior-for instance, when government auditors honestly and
competently investigate and report in a manner consistent with professional
reporting standards, or when government attorneys write memoranda
consistent with their profession's ethical dictates-they help to maintain
consistency between the functions government purports to perform and
those that it actually performs. In so doing, public employees can disrupt
government efforts to have it both ways by purporting publicly to provide a
service while distorting the nature of that service.
Disrupting government information distortion, in short, is one important
means by which public employees dissent. By "information distortion," I
refer to the phenomenon whereby government purports to provide or
subsidize information of a type that is defined by reference to professional
or social norms, while manipulating the information in a manner antithetical
to those norms. Distortion occurs, for example, where government hires
climate scientists to make climate projections but insists that they alter their
findings for political reasons as a condition of their continued employment.
Distortion alters the very picture of reality against which the public can
assess or respond to government actions and decisions.37 By disrupting
distortion-even when one does so unintentionally, through the simple act
of performing one's job in keeping with professional norms and standards-
one effectively engages in political dissent that directly or indirectly impacts
information that makes its way to the public. 8
Once we understand that much work product speech impacts public
discourse, and that the work product speech most vulnerable to discipline
37. For other discussions ofinformation distortion, see, for example, Helen Norton, Constraining
Public Employee Speech: Government's Control ofIts Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression,
59 DUKE L.J. 1, 27-31 (2009) (explaining that free speech concerns are raised when government's role
in crafting speech ofemployeesor subsidy recipients is obscured); Caroline MalaCorbin, Mixed Speech:
When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605,665-71 (2008) (making similar
point); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REv. 1377, 1397-1401, 1450, 1460-61, 1487, 1491 (2001) (same).
38. This paragraph and the one preceding it are adapted from Kitrosser, The Special Value of
Public Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 302-03, 325.
2018] 1411
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often constitutes political dissent, dynamic diversity's lessons about its
value follow quite readily. After all, dynamic diversity places political
dissent at its core.3 9 It also emphasizes the importance of speaker diversity,
the value of which may be at its apex where the speakers at issue are
government employees. As Magarian puts it, "[p]ublic employees often
have deeper insights than anyone into the government's workings and
failings."4 0 They also have subject matter expertise. And they are well
situated to impact public discourse directly or indirectly, including by
disrupting government efforts to distort public knowledge. Finally, as
political dissent by persons in the government's employ, dissenting work
product speech is as vulnerable to suppression as it is valuable.
B. Internal Work Product Speech
Even if we were to close our eyes to the broad and deep ties between
work product speech and public discourse, we would still find seeds of
substantial support for work product speech in dynamic diversity. While
dynamic diversity indeed focuses on public discourse, its ultimate concern
is speech as a medium for "challenging stable institutions and testing new
ideas."4 1 There are few more effective ways to bake dialogue and challenge
into the production of government ideas and actions than by placing expert
career servants throughout the government and granting them some
protection for their on-the-job speech. From this perspective, public
employees possess special value as speakers in two ways-through their
unique insider knowledge and subject matter expertise, and through their
access to unique channels of communication, including internal channels.
As we have seen, these channels can encompass the simple acts of
employees doing their jobs compatibly with the norms of their profession.
They can also include special avenues to raise grievances, such as when
agencies provide employees with special complaint procedures or
privileged access to inspectors general.42
In a sense, I propose a friendly supplement to Magarian's concept of
speaker diversity, one that explicitly acknowledges that diversity's value
can flow not only from the unique views and knowledge of certain
individuals, but from their special access to communication channels that
enable them to challenge powerful institutions. This aspect of speaker
diversity, combined with Magarian's embrace of political dissent and his
view of speech as a means to "challenge stable institutions," provide a very
39. MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at 34.
40. Id. at 90.
41. Id. at xviii.
42. Kitrosser, The Special Value ofPublic Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 302, 331.
1412 [VOL. 95:1405
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natural bridge to Blasi's checking theory of the First Amendment,4 3 even
for purely intra-governmental communications.
These free-speech-theory-based insights are bolstered further by
constitutional structure. Most important for our purposes are those checks
on presidential power that empower subordinates to dissent." Elsewhere, I
have discussed such checking mechanisms in depth.45 I summarize them
here, starting with those that draw directly on constitutional text. A number
of textual details-including but not limited to the division of the
appointments power between the president and the Senate, Congress's
constitutional ability to delegate some inferior officer appointments away
from the president, and the Opinions Clause, which confirms that the
president may require written opinions from executive department heads-
suggest an executive branch in which the president has substantial but not
unfettered supervisory authority and in which his subordinates are potential
checks against abuse or incompetence.46
The textual indications are bolstered by history from the framing and
ratification period. For example, supporters of the proposed Constitution
insisted that the Framers, in declining to annex a council to the president,
had intentionally deprived the president of a group that would do his bidding
and hide his secrets. Alexander Hamilton argued that the president not only
would lack a council behind which to hide, but that his appointed
subordinates, who were subject to Senate approval, would be unlikely to
shield his bad acts.47
These structural aspects of the Constitution and its history confirm the
dual role of public employees in the federal system. On the one hand,
government employees are part of the executive branch and are charged
with supporting its efficacy. On the other hand, government employees are
crucial safety valves for protecting the people from abuse and
incompetence, given their unique access to information and to a range of
internal and external avenues for transmitting the same.
While the Constitution does not dictate the structure of state or local
governments, the logic underlying the federal model-that internal checks
are necessary to head off tyranny or incompetence by superiors-also
bolsters the insights of free speech theory as it relates to the states and
localities.
43. See Blasi, supra note 32.
44. The remainder of this Section, including internal citations, is adapted from Kitrosser, The
Special Value ofPublic Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 329-30.
45. See, e.g., HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILrY 143-72 (2015) (Chapter 7).
46. For elaboration on these points, see id. at 147-162.
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 373 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).
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II. THE ROBERTS COURT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE WORK PRODUCT
SPEECH
The question of public employee work product speech value became
newly salient in 2006, in light of a major Roberts Court decision. In Garcetti
v. Ceballos, a majority of the Court held that public employees are not
entitled to any First Amendment protections against workplace disciplinary
action for speech engaged in as part of their jobs-that is, for work product
speech.48 The Court offered its only elaboration on Garcetti to date in the
2014 case of Lane v. Franks.4 9 There, the Court clarified that speech does
not automatically constitute work product, and thus fall within the Garcetti
rule, simply because it consists of information learned in the course of
performing one's job duties.50
Garcetti and Lane are part of a line of cases that comprise the modern
doctrine of public employee speech rights. Prior to the mid-20th century,
courts invoked the rights/privileges distinction and recognized no first
amendment entitlement against workplace discipline for public
employees." In 1968's Pickering v. Board ofEducation, the Supreme Court
established both that public employees have some protection from being
terminated or disciplined by employers for their speech, and that the
government has broader discretion to punish speech when it operates as an
employer than when it acts as sovereign.5 2 In the years between Pickering
and Garcetti, the Court established that employer discipline is permitted
either: (1) where the speech at issue is about a matter of purely private
concern, 53 or (2) where the speech is on a matter of public concern, but the
employer's efficiency interests outweigh the interests of the employee "as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern." 54 Garcetti added
an additional, categorical step. That is, if the employee's speech constitutes
work product, then it is entirely unprotected, regardless of its subject matter
48. 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
49. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
50. Id. at 2379 ("[T]he mere fact that a citizen's specch concerns information acquired by virtue
of his public employment does not transform that speech into employee-rather than citizen-speech.").
51. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a First
Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REv. 115, 147-48 (2006) ("To anchor the free speech rights of
public employees to those of private sector employees vis-A-vis their employers would .. . take us back
to the heyday of the 'rights-privileges' distinction and virtually wipe out public employee speech
rights."). See also McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.)
(featuring Justice Holmes's now well-known observation that "[tihe petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman").
52. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
53. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-43, 146-47 (1983).
54. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-54, 140, 142 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); Pickering, 391
U.S. at 568.
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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
or of what the outcome would be were the Connick-Pickering balance
applied."
Garcetti thus raised anew the question of why courts protect public
employee speech in the first place. In particular, it posed a fresh subset of
that question: whether public employee work product speech is as valuable,
and deserves the same protection, as other public employee speech on
matters of public concern. Garcetti also forces an assessment of the needs
that lie opposite any free speech value-that is, government employers'
interests in controlling work product speech.
In this Part, I apply Part I's insights to reflect on Garcetti's (and Lane's)
understandings of free speech value. I also invoke Part I's analysis, as well
as Magarian's conception of managed speech, to assess the Garcetti Court's
approach to government's managerial interests. In Section II.A, I consider
the Court's understandings of public employee speech value as reflected in
Garcetti and Lane and their predecessor cases. Overall, the cases reflect a
crabbed and somewhat confused conception of public employee speech
value. Although the Court repeatedly cites the special free speech value that
public employees bear by virtue of their unique knowledge and expertise,
this appreciation is belied by the Garcetti rule itself. Garcetti also reflects
the Court's failure to grasp the structural part of public employees' special
value as speakers-that is, their privileged access not only to information,
but to communication channels for conveying it. In Section II.B, I review
the Garcetti Court's articulation of the government's interests in exempting
work product speech from judicial review. The Court's discussion betrays
some uncertainty over the nature of the relevant interests. More importantly,
it reflects a dramatic over-reading of government employers' needs for
exclusive managerial control over work product speech.
A. The Value ofPublic Employee Speech
1. Doctrinal Background
In explaining why it grants public employees any free speech protections
at all, the Supreme Court since Pickering has repeatedly invoked two
rationales. One, termed the "parity theory" by Randy Kozel,56 is that
government employees should not be robbed of "the First Amendment
rights that they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of
public interest."" The second justification, which I call the "special value"
55. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
56. Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory ofPublic Employee Rights, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1985, 1990 (2012). -
57. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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rationale, suggests that public employees deserve free speech protections
not because they are just like everybody else, but because they have
something special to contribute to the speech marketplace. They "are often
the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as
to the operations of their public employers, operations which are of
substantial concern to the public."" When it comes to the special value
rationale, "[t]he interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving
informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it.""
The parity rationale by itself explains very little. Among other
difficulties, the Connick-Pickering test bears little resemblance to, and thus
shows little parity with, the speech protections that apply in other settings.
Nor does the parity rationale offer guidance as to what aspects of doctrine
or theory we should look to for comparative purposes. The concept of parity,
in short, does little work beyond contributing to the view that public
employee speech warrants some First Amendment protection. 60 This leaves
us with the special value rationale as the Supreme Court's only clearly
articulated, substantive basis for protecting public employee speech.
The Garcetti Court itself cited approvingly to the special value
rationale,6 ' and insisted that its approach was not inconsistent with it.62 The
Court explained that "[r]efusing to recognize First Amendment claims
based on government employees' work product does not prevent them from
participating in public debate. The employees retain the prospect of
constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic discourse." 63
Some commentators have taken this point a step further, suggesting that
Garcetti predominantly impacts non-public speech,' and that such speech
has little First Amendment value. 65
58. City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004).
59. Id.
60. See Kitrosser, The Special Value ofPublic Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 308; Kozel,
supra note 56, at 1989-90, 2013-22 (deeming parity rationale incompatible with modern public
employee speech doctrine and describing what a parity-based doctrine would look like); Estlund,
supra note 51, at 149 ("When we scratch the surface of the [Garcetti] majority's recurring references
to the 'liberties the employec might have enjoyed as a private citizen,' they appear to be less an aid to
analysis than a rhetorical trope.").
61. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419-21.
62. Id. at 422 ("This result is consistent with our precedents' attention to the potential societal
value of employee speech.").
63. Id.
64. See Kermit Roosevelt Ill, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 649 (2012) ("Garcetti does not reach speech to the public, unless producing
such speech is the employee's job (in which case the speech is actually the government's speech).");
Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law ofManagerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L.
REv. 33, 57 (2008) ("For public employees who take their concerns to the public, Garcetti should pose
no bar to First Amendment protection . . . .").
65. See Roosevelt, supra note 64, at 653-54 ("[T]he First Amendment ... is intended to facilitate
public oversight of government, and that purpose is not served by intra-governmental speech. The line
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The majority also tied its observation that employees remain free to
participate in public debate to the parity rationale. It explained that work
product speech, unlike participation in public debate, "owes its existence to
a public employee's professional responsibilities;" suppressing it thus "does
not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen." 66
The parity-based segment of Garcetti's reasoning generated the
uncertainty that led to Lane v. Franks. Some lower courts, relying on
Garcetti's statement that speech is unprotected when it "owes its existence"
to the speaker's public employment, leaned heavily against protecting
speech consisting of information learned in the course of such
employment." The Eleventh Circuit took this view in Lane, deeming a
public employee's testimony, under oath, about financial fraud in the
statewide youth program that he directed to be unprotected work product
speech.68
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, clarifying that "the
mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of
his public employment does not transform that speech into employee-
rather than citizen-speech."6 9 The Court emphasized that "our precedents
. . . have recognized that speech by public employees on subject matter
related to their employment holds special value precisely because those
between talking frankly to superiors and voicing concerns publicly marks a real distinction from the
First Amendment perspective."); Rosenthal, supra note 64, at 59 ("When a public employee brings
heretofore concealed misconduct into public view, he enables the process of political accountability to
function. Such employees deserve First Amendment protection for just that reason. Public employees
whose views remain hidden from public view, in contrast, contribute little to public discussion and
debate.").
66. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22; see also Estlund, supra note 51, at 144-45 (citing "a recurring
motif in the Garcetti majority opinion: the effort to anchor the free speech rights of public employees to
the 'liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen,"' and explaining the restrictive
effects of this motif).
67. Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 315 n.56 (quoting
Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1279, 1283 (1lth Cir. 2009) (deeming reports unprotected
because they concerned information learned through investigations performed "as part of [plaintiffs']
assigned duties"); Abdur-Rahman, 567 F.3d at 1289 (Barkett, J., dissenting) ("[T]he essence of the
majority opinion, with its emphasis on Garcetti's phrase 'owes its existence to,' appears to be that speech
about anything a public employee learns about in the course of performing his job . . . is unprotected,
because the speech would not exist without the job activity."); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185
(3d Cir. 2009) ("We have held ... that a claimant's speech might be considered part of his official duties
if it relatesto 'special knowledge' or 'experience' acquired through hisjob."). Butsee Dougherty v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 989 (3d Cir. 2014) (clarifying, post-Lane, that Gorum does not stand for
proposition that the special knowledge factor alone makes speech unprotected).
68. Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty Coll., 523 F. App'x 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded sub nom. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (relying solely on fact that Lane's
testimony was about acts performed in his official capacity, although stating that that fact was "not
dispositive" of conclusion that the testimony was unprotected).
69. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).
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employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their
employment.""
2. Evaluating the Roberts Court's Approach to Special Value
Among Garcetti's most glaring problems is its crabbed vision of special
value. The Court nods to precedent by acknowledging the unique
knowledge and insights that public employees possess.7' Yet in insisting
that that value is not squandered because employees remain free to
"participat[e] in public debate," 72 the Court misconceives special value on
both practical and theoretical levels. First, the Court seems not to appreciate
the broad and deep connections between work product speech and public
discourse. As we saw in Section I.A, much government work product
speech either is prepared for public consumption or indirectly shapes the
information that makes its way to the public. Relatedly, the Court overlooks
the information-distorting effects that politicized employer control of work
product speech can have on public debate. For example, where a
government scientist is pressured to downplay or misrepresent their
scientific findings because of superiors' concerns about their political
implications, the public may be actively misled.7 3
Most fundamentally, the Court misses the fact that the special
constitutional value of public employee speech stems from employees'
privileged access not only to information, but to channels for conveying it.
Among the most important of these channels is the simple act of crafting
work product honestly and competently, even in the face of political
pressure to deviate from professional norms or standards. By so doing,
public employees can disrupt government efforts to distort information. 7 4
Other special channels include internal reporting avenues, ranging from
informal meetings with superiors to the ability to file reports with agencies'
inspectors general. 75 Given how little Garcetti actually said about the scope
of the work product speech category,76 and the broad interpretations
rendered by some lower courts since Garcetti was decided,77 public
70. Id.
71. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419-21.
72. Id. at 422.
73. See supra Section L.A.
74. See supra Part 1.
75. See supra Section LB.
76. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (noting that the parties did not dispute that the speech at issue
constituted work product, and that the Court thus had "no occasion to articulate a comprehensive
framework for defining the scope of an employce's duties in cases where there is room for serious
debate").
77. See Kitrosser, The Special Value ofPublic Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 314-23 (citing
cases).
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employees can find themselves without constitutional protection for using
such internal channels-for instance, for reporting concerns through their
chain of command rather than to the press." In stripping public employees
of constitutional protection for these varied means of communication, the
Roberts Court undermined their crucial structural roles as internal checks
on government power.
The Roberts Court has not, of course, borne only bad news for special
value. In Lane, the Court contained some of the damage caused by Garcetti
by refusing to accept the Eleventh Circuit's very broad definition of work
product speech, which would have covered any speech conveying
information learned on the job. In so doing, the Lane Court acknowledged
the force of the special value rationale invoked in cases stretching back to
Pickering, and correctly reasoned that the Eleventh Circuit's approach
defeated the very feature-public employees' unique knowledge-that
makes public employee speech so valuable.79 Still, Lane is hardly a panacea.
For one thing, it is subject to the possibility of a very narrow, fact-bound
reading, although, as I have explained elsewhere, that reading would be a
poor one.so More importantly, Lane does not cure Garcetti's central
problem, which is the latter's enervated conception of special value.
B. Government's Managerial Interests
Apart from minimizing the free speech interests at stake, the Garcetti
Court invoked "the emphasis of our precedents on affording government
employers sufficient discretion to manage their operations.""1 Employers, it
added, "have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an
employee in his or her professional capacity." 82
The Court was less than precise, however, about the nature of the
managerial interests at stake. As Kermit Roosevelt writes, the Court
"gesture[s]" at two main manifestations of the interest." The first-the
"government speech" rationale-is the position that "speech produced
pursuant to official duties [is] in some sense government speech." When
employees speak as the government, the government must have free reign
78. See id. at 320-22, nn.84-92 and accompanying text (citing cases).
79. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).
80. See Kitrosser, The Special Value ofPublic Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 311-12
(noting that "Lane is potentially subject to a narrow reading, one that limits it to settings in which
speech consists of 'truthful subpoenaed testimony' that is not part of the speaker's ordinary job duties,"
but explaining why that would constitute a poor interpretation).
81. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
82. Id.
83. Roosevelt, supra note 64, at 635.
84. Id.
2018] 1419
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to dictate, judge, or correct what they say.15 The second managerial
discretion argument-the "evaluation rationale"-is that spoken or written
work product "should be conceptualized as job performance rather than
speech,"" and courts are in no position-either constitutionally or as a
practical matter-to second-guess supervisors' job performance
evaluations.87
Neither of the Court's managerial rationales justify Garcetti's sweeping
categorical rule. The government speech rationale is wildly overbroad.
While some public employment entails conveying messages that are
dictated by one's superiors," this is simply not true of much government
work. Many government jobs-including Ceballos's assistant district
attorney position 89 and Lane's role as program director 9o-call upon
employees to exercise a nontrivial degree of independent judgment. 9' Were
such employees required to parrot scripted messages in lieu of conveying
their professional judgments, they would effectively be a party to
information distortion. 92
The evaluation rationale rests on more solid ground, but nonetheless is
considerably overstated. Most importantly, it rests on the faulty assumption
that judicial scrutiny of work product speech retaliation claims must entail
substantive assessments of work product quality. To the contrary, judicial
review of such claims can and should be designed to ferret out retaliation
for reasons other than work product quality. Under this approach, courts
would effectively leave non-pretextual decisions based on work product
quality untouched. At the same time, they would evaluate purported quality-
based decisions to determine whether they are pretexts for non-quality-
based retaliation. Where work product speech is punished for reasons other
than its quality, courts could proceed to apply the Connick-Pickering test.
As I elaborated in an earlier article:
a government lawyer's supervisor would[, under this approach,] have
free rein to discipline her for turning in a memorandum "riddled with
85. Indeed, it is on this basis that Kermit Roosevelt dismisses concerns about Garcetti's impact
on public specch. He acknowledges that "[s]ome employees might have the job of communicating to the
public." Roosevelt, supra note 64, at 647 n.62. He concludes, however, that "such an employee is
probably best conceived of as speaking for the government, in which case the government would be
allowed to dictate the content of the speech." Id.
86. Id. at 635.
87. Id. at 653.
88. See Norton, supra note 37, at 30-31.
89. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
90. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014).
91. See Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 325-28
nn. 110-25 and accompanying text.
92. See Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, supra note 9, at 333-34
(rejecting government speech rationale).
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errors of legal analysis." Similarly, a government scientist's superior
would be free to discipline her for sloppy research methods or poorly
written reports. On the other hand, retaliating against a government
lawyer for her internal legal advice, not because the advice is unsound
but because it provides a politically inconvenient answer, is not a
work quality-based judgment. Nor would it constitute a work quality-
based decision were a government scientist's supervisors to discipline
her for reaching scientific conclusions in tension with an
administration's policy agenda. On the other hand, [the failure of an
employee who was hired to convey a specified message] to stick to
her script could legitimately be deemed poor work quality warranting
discipline.93
While distinguishing pre-textual reasons from real ones and smoking out
illegal motives are not easy tasks, they are jobs that courts are well-equipped
to perform. Indeed, courts regularly conduct such analyses in a range of
settings, including constitutional and employment cases. Courts routinely
ask, for example, whether laws are based on the content of speech facially
or in their underlying purposes.94 And in constitutional and statutory
discrimination cases, courts often evaluate whether neutral explanations for
workplace discipline or other actions are pretexts for discrimination.95
If the Roberts Court exaggerates government's managerial needs over
the speech of its employees, Magarian's work helps us to see the links
between that overstatement and the Roberts Court's larger commitment to
managed speech. Indeed, the Court's unearned certainty, in Garcetti, that
employers' evaluative needs cannot be reconciled with judicial review,
parallels its credulity toward the government's sweeping national security
arguments in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. And in its expansive
conception of speech that effectively belongs to the government because it
has "conmmissioned or created" it," Garcetti anticipates the Robert Court's
generous definition, in two subsequent cases, of "government speech."97
The Court's remarkable deference to government's claimed managerial
needs, along with its clearing of wide zones of physical and virtual space
for "government speech," is consistent with what Magarian calls the
promotion of "social and political stability" at the expense of "modes of
public discussion that threaten to destabilize existing arrangements of social
and political power."98 In Garcetti, we see that potentially destabilizing
93. Id. at 336 (internal citation omitted).
94. Id. at 340 nn. 170-73 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 340-41 nn.174-75 and accompanying text.
96. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
97. See cases cited supra note 8.
98. MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xv.
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discussions internal to government are disfavored as well. Magarian's
observations help us to make sense of why and how it is that the Roberts
Court places so much faith in government's representations of its
managerial needs, and of what is sacrificed in the process.
CONCLUSION
Of course, the Roberts Court did not invent the phenomenon of judicial
deference to the government's claimed managerial needs. Highly
deferential applications of the Connick-Pickering test by earlier Courts
make that much clear." Nor did the Roberts Court pioneer the government
speech doctrine, which originated in the Rehnquist Court. 0 0 Yet in its
categorical removal of work product speech from protection and its
broadening of the field of government speech, the Roberts Court has taken
these phenomena to new heights.
Magarian's work helps us to connect the dots between a number of cases,
and to identify a commitment to managed speech as their joining thread.
Such commitment evinces something more than a strict loyalty to precedent
or to the notoriously opaque text and history of the first amendment.' 0
Rather, it reveals certain practical and normative understandings of the
respective roles played by powerful institutions and dissenters in discourse
about matters of public importance. To borrow a phrase from the Roberts
Court's namesake, the Court's public employment cases, along with a
number of its other free speech cases, reflect something more than the mere
calling of "balls and strikes."' 02 Through his concept of managed speech,
Professor Magarian helps us to understand what that "something more"
might entail.
99. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, (1983).
100. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (citing
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1919) to the
effect that the government may "regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker
or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message"). Indeed, the Garcetti Court cited this
aspect of Rosenberger in referring approvingly to government control over speech that "the employer
itself has commissioned or created." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
101. For reference to this opacity, see, for example, Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the
Leaky Ship of State, 6 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 409, 421-22 (2013), and sources cited therein.
102. Roberts: "My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat," CNN (Sept. 12, 2005,
4:58 PM), https://perma.cc/CM39-XKGY.
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